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The Common Link in Failures and Scandals at the 
World’s Leading Banks 
Justin O’Brien* & Olivia Dixon** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the roots of recent institutional failures run deep, this past 
northern summer has revealed substantial compliance, risk management, 
and governance failures at major international banks at an unprecedented 
level. The exposure of a new wave of scandals at JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., HSBC Holdings plc, and Standard Chartered Bank plc, and the pan-
el-member banks under transatlantic investigation for the manipulation 
of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) points to systemic gov-
ernance failures that also call into doubt the structural integrity of current 
models of financial regulation. Taken together, they suggest that both 
regulated entities and their regulators face a profound legitimacy and 
authority crisis. The causes of the problems facing the banking industry 
and its regulators, while complex, share a common theme. They derive 
from a failure to integrate what we term the five core dimensions of in-
ternal and external oversight: compliance, ethics, deterrence, accounta-
bility and risk (CEDAR). 
In the aftermath of the crisis, there are pressing reasons to revisit 
the fundamental purpose of corporate governance and financial regula-
tion and to evaluate to what extent the reform agenda addresses the re-
vealed limitations of current and proposed frameworks. It is in the inter-
est of both the regulator and the regulated that one has substantive con-
ceptions of compliance, rather than mechanical conceptions that are easi-
ly transacted around. It is in their common interest for there to be war-
ranted commitment to ethical standards rather than a stated aspiration 
that lacks the granularity to be enforceable. Likewise, only effective de-
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terrence can assure public confidence, which necessitates demonstrable 
internal capacity and willingness to police and punish deviance. This, in 
turn, augments accountability, without which confidence cannot be as-
sured. Ultimately, the goal of internal governance and external supervi-
sion through financial regulation is to reduce risk. This can only be 
vouchsafed, however, by evaluating the extent to which all five dimen-
sions are integrated within an overarching design that encompasses man-
date, corporate or bureaucratic process, and use of discretion. The 
CEDAR matrix serves, therefore, both a diagnostic and an evaluative 
function across mandate, process, and the use of discretion. 
The first dimension of CEDAR is compliance, which includes the 
notion of compliance risk. Compliance risk is defined as “the risk of le-
gal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation a 
bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, regula-
tions, rules, related self-regulatory organization standards, and codes of 
conduct applicable to its banking activities.”1 Parliamentary and congres-
sional investigations into the recent banking scandals have shown that in 
each case compliance risk was exacerbated by globalized institutional 
structures that were too big to manage internally and too big to regulate 
externally. Against this rubric both the internal compliance paradigm and 
external deterrence strategies of enforcement are inherently unworkable. 
In the United States for example, where threats of criminal prosecution 
are hollow and breaches are routinely sanctioned by financial regulators 
through negotiated settlements,2 there has been little incentive for such 
“systemically important financial institutions”3 to implement a robust 
compliance program that extends beyond symbolism. Given the amount 
of repeat offenders, there is scant evidence to suggest that negotiated set-
tlements encourage any meaningful behavioral change. Indeed, an influ-
ential New York district court judge, Jed Rakoff, argues that these 
agreements privilege the “facade of enforcement.”4 In the United King-
dom, the situation is even more problematic given the failure to hold any 
                                                        
 1. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Compliance and the Compliance Function in Banks, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS § 3 (Apr. 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf. 
 2. A negotiated settlement agreement is a voluntary alternative to adjudication in which the 
prosecuting agency agrees to grant amnesty in exchange for the defendant agreeing to fulfill certain 
requirements such as paying fines, implementing corporate reforms, and fully cooperating with the 
investigation. 
 3. Defined as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, 
complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider finan-
cial system and economic activity.” Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD. 1 (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/public 
ations/r_111104bb.pdf. 
 4. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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individual accountable.5 Trust, which is the foundation of banking and its 
regulation, has in consequence and for good reason evaporated. 
But ascertaining who or what is responsible for these banking scan-
dals, who should be held accountable, and more fundamentally, how the 
oversight model could or should be redesigned remains exceptionally 
problematic. The core and unresolved issue pivots on purpose, both for 
the corporation and for the market in which it is nested. As Edward Ma-
son famously noted in 1960, “[t]he fact seems to be that the rise of the 
large corporation and attending circumstances have confronted us with a 
long series of questions concerning rights and duties, privileges and im-
munities, responsibility and authority, that political and legal philosophy 
have not yet assimilated.”6 The passage of time has demonstrated not 
only the sagacity of this insight, but also its particular relevance to the 
financial services industry. 
Some have argued that the rapid expansion of financial services in 
recent years has disproportionately benefited the industry itself.7 Propo-
nents of this narrative advocate structural changes, such as reimposing 
the Banking Act of 1933,8 also known as the Glass–Steagall Act,9 or im-
plementing a strict-form ban on proprietary trading under the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank).10 
Others blame weak regulators.11 This privileges a familiar regulatory 
capture narrative.12 It notes the failure of central bank officials and gov-
                                                        
 5. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH, THE FAILURE OF THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND (Dec. 2011), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf. (“Quite reasonably . . . people want to know why 
RBS failed. And they want to understand whether failure resulted from a level of incompetence, a 
lack of integrity, or dishonesty which can be subject to legal sanction.”). 
 6. EDWARD MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 19 (1959). 
 7. See, e.g., Liam Halligan, ‘Liborgate’ Could Trigger Crucial Banking Reform, TELEGRAPH 
(July 7, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/liamhalligan/9383982/ Liborgate-
could-trigger-crucial-banking-reform.html. 
 8. 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1933). 
 9. The Glass–Steagall Act limited commercial bank securities activities and affiliations be-
tween commercial banks and securities firms. See A.J. Hebert III, Requiem on the Glass-Stegall Act: 
Tracing the Evolution and Current Status of Bank Involvement in Brokerage Activities, 63 TUL. L. 
REV. 157, 158 (1988). 
 10. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Ben Protess & Mark Scott, Bank Scandal Turns Spotlight to Regulators, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (July 9, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/libor-scandal-intensifies-
spotlight-on-bank-regulators/; Peter Gumbel, LIBOR Rigging: What the Regulators Saw (But Didn’t 
Shut Down), TIME (July 16, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/16/libor-rigging-what-the-
regulators-saw-but-didnt-shut-down/. 
 12. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971), available at http://www.rasmusen.org/zg601/readings/Stigler.1971.pdf; James Free-
man, Regulators Captured, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10000872396390444812704577607421541441692.html. 
944 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:941 
ernment regulators to respond to patent misconduct that is, in some cas-
es, exposed years prior to the commencement of official investigations.13 
As with all compelling narratives, each is plausible. What is lost, howev-
er, is perhaps an even more disturbing reality. While most of the scandals 
have excised the “rotten apples” deemed responsible, it could well be the 
case that it is actually the “barrel that is the cause of the problem.”14 If 
so, then no amount of structural tinkering alone will be sufficient: one 
cannot solve normative problems with technical measures alone. 
Should one rely on rules alone, there is the demonstrable danger 
that they will be transacted around; likewise, a reliance on principles 
lacks application in circumstances in which the actors have no concep-
tions—or very limited and emasculated conceptions—of what those 
principles are.15 What needs to be mapped and tracked, therefore, is the 
extent to which rules and principles interact within specific epistemic 
communities of practice, whether they are professional, corporate, or 
regulatory. This in turn forces reflection on the question of culture, a re-
curring motif in the report of the United Kingdom Treasury Select 
Committee on the LIBOR price-manipulation scandal.16 It is an issue 
initially raised but since then quietly buried by senior regulatory figures 
in the United Kingdom in the immediate aftermath of the Global Finan-
cial Crisis.17 However, this Article argues that both the root cause of the 
                                                        
 13. Freeman, supra note 12. 
 14. Jan Kregel, The LIBOR Scandal: The Fix is in – The Bank of England Did It! Policy Note, 
LEVY ECON. INST. BARD COLL. (Sept. 2012), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_12_09.pdf. 
 15. See, e.g., Hector Sants, Chief Exec., Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at the Reuters Newsmaker 
Event: Delivering Intensive Supervision and Credible Deterrence (Mar. 12, 2009) (transcript availa-
ble at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml) (“I continue to 
believe the majority of market participants are decent people; however, a principles-based approach 
does not work with individuals who have no principles.”). 
 16. TREASURY COMMITTEE, FIXING LIBOR: SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS, 2012-13, H.C. 
481-II (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cm 
treasy/481/48102.htm. 
 17. See Hector Sants, Chief Exec., Fin. Servs. Auth., Annual Lubbock Lecture in Management 
Studies: UK Financial Regulation: After the Crisis (Mar. 12, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2010/0312_hs.shtml). Sants states as fol-
lows: 
We need to answer the question of whether a regulator has a legitimate focus to intervene 
on the question of culture. This arguably requires both a view on the right culture and a 
mechanism for intervention. Answering yes to this question would undoubtedly signifi-
cantly extend the FSA’s engagement with industry. My personal view is that if we really 
do wish to learn lessons from the past, we need to change not just the regulatory rules and 
supervisory approach, but also the culture and attitudes of both society as a whole, and 
the management of major financial firms. This will not be easy. A cultural trend can be 
very widespread and resilient – as has been seen by a return to a ‘business as usual’ men-
tality. Nevertheless, no culture is inevitable. 
Id. 
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crisis and the route to restoring trust and confidence is to be found in as-
certaining how to regulate culture across mandates, processes, and use of 
discretion. 
Part II identifies the internal and external failings of four of the 
most recent global banking scandals within the CEDAR matrix. Part III 
discusses the regulatory challenges faced when compliance serves no 
practical function and the consequent material risk to market integrity. 
This Article concludes by suggesting that it is unsustainable for regula-
tion to be decided, implemented, and monitored at a national level. Glob-
al oversight has become an imperative to reduce the conflicts of interest 
that may create profitable industries, but not socially beneficial ones. 
II. RECENT CASE STUDIES 
A. JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
On May 10, 2012, JPMorgan disclosed a “surprise” trading loss of 
at least $2 billion.18 The loss was linked to a complex hedging strategy 
based on synthetic credit default swaps made by traders in London on 
behalf of the New York-based chief investment office (CIO).19 Accord-
ing to the chief executive officer, Mr. Jamie Dimon, “the losses emerged 
after the firm tried to reduce that position and unwind the portfolio.”20 In 
the immediate aftermath of the disclosure, JPMorgan shareholders saw 
about $30 billion of market value obliterated.21 The control failures at 
JPMorgan were not the consequence of rogue traders operating in a niche 
market far removed from the corridors of power (the “rotten apple theo-
ry”). The traders were executing a strategy on behalf of the CIO. Its 
function was to “hedge the bank’s exposure on loans and other credit 
risks to corporations, banks, and sovereign governments.”22 Nothing 
could be more central to JPMorgan’s risk management, yet it appeared to 
be operating out of control. Unraveling how and why this occurred is 
instructive about the difficulties associated with conflating compliance 
with risk management. Moreover, it also highlights multiple ex post and 
                                                        
 18. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961712000264/jpm-2012063010q.htm. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Dawn Kopecki, Michael J. Moore & Christine Harper, JPMorgan Loses $2 Billion on 
Unit’s ‘Egregious Mistakes,’ BLOOMBERG (May 11, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
05-11/jpmorgan-loses-2-billion-as-mistakes-trounce-hedges.html. 
 21. Erik Schatzker, Dawn Kopecki & Bradley Keoun, House of Dimon Marred by CEP Com-
placency over Units Risk, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-
12/house-of-dimon-marred-by-ceo-complacency-over-unit-s-risk.html. 
 22. Kopecki, Moore & Harper, supra note 20. 
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ex ante accountability failures within the bank itself and with its regula-
tors where confusion reigned over just who was responsible for monitor-
ing risk and whether the global nature of the operations fatally under-
mined any meaningful capacity to regulate. 
The first signs of problems had surfaced a month prior, on April 6, 
2012. The Wall Street Journal reported that one bullish trader, nick-
named the “London Whale,” was taking such large positions that he was 
moving prices in the $10 trillion market.23 At the time, JPMorgan’s chief 
financial officer, Mr. Doug Braunstein, stated that the bank was “very 
comfortable” with the CIO’s positions.24 In a conference call to analysts, 
Mr. Dimon, the chief executive officer, dismissed concerns about the 
trading activities, calling them a “complete tempest in a teapot.”25 The 
public policy implications of the trading loss were examined when Mr. 
Dimon appeared before the Senate Banking Committee on June 13, 
2012, and the House Financial Services Committee on June 19, 2012.26 
The latter hearing, entitled “Examining Bank Supervision and Risk Man-
agement in Light of JPMorgan Chase’s Trading Loss,” highlighted con-
fusion and disagreement over which regulatory agency was in charge of 
monitoring risk.27 By July 13, 2012, total losses were projected at close 
to $7 billion.28 Federal regulators, who were already examining the 
                                                        
 23. Dawn Kopecki & Max Abelson, Dimon Fortress Breached as Push from Hedges to Bets 
Blows Up, BUSINESSWEEK (May 14, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-14/dimon-
fortress-breached-as-push-from-hedging-to-betting-blows-up. 
 24. Dan Fitzpatrick, Jean Eaglesham, & Joann S. Lublin, J.P. Morgan CFO to Exit Post, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044479990457804896150718 
6872.html. 
 25. Polya Lesova, Dimon: London Whale Issues “Tempest in a Teapot,” Market Watch, WALL 
ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-04-13/industries/31335210_1_london-
whale-tempest-jamie-dimon. 
 26. A Breakdown in Risk Management: What Went Wrong with JPMorgan Chase: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Jamie 
Dimon, Chairman & CEO, JPMorgan Chase & Co.) [hereinafter Breakdown in Risk Management 
Hearing], available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/JPMCCIOTestimony.pdf; 
Examining Bank Supervision and Risk Management in Light of JPMorgan Chase’s Trading Loss: 
Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Jamie Dimon, Chair-
man & CEO, JPMorgan Chase & Co.) [hereinafter Examining Bank Supervision Hearing], available 
at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ba00-wstate-jdimon-20120619.pdf. 
 27. Referring to the Fed’s written testimony, Representative Pearce stated, “[W]e [congress] 
simply oversee! You are in charge of risk. That is what you say.” Examining Bank Supervision 
Hearing, supra note 26 (statement of Rep. Steven Pearce), available at http://financialservic 
es.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=299359. “[N]o, we are not the one in charge of the 
OCC. We are the consolidated supervisor.” Id. (statement of Scott Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Fed. 
Reserve). 
 28. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New Fraud Inquiry as JPMorgan’s Loss Mounts, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (July 13, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/jpmorgan-says-traders-
obscured-losses-in-first-quarter. 
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trades, began examining whether the bank’s traders may have intention-
ally tried to obscure the full extent of the losses to defraud investors.29 
JPMorgan senior management conceded that the hedging strategy was 
“flawed, complex, poorly reviewed, poorly executed and poorly moni-
tored.”30 It was a far cry from Mr. Dimon’s “tempest in a teapot” analo-
gy. 
The corporate and policy confusion over how to identify or deal 
with risk has implications far beyond the losses in this particular trade. 
As William Cohan has pointed out, JPMorgan’s trading losses “played 
right into the hands of pundits.”31 In particular, they renewed vigor to the 
debate in Washington on the implementation of Dodd–Frank, the sweep-
ing legislation designed to curb corporate excess and embed restraint, 
passed in response to the global financial crisis.32 In regulation, all battles 
are won or lost at the implementation stage. The immediate impact of the 
JPMorgan trading losses will be seen in debates surrounding the still-
stalled implementation of section 619 of Dodd–Frank, known as the 
Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule was designed to prohibit proprietary 
trading by those institutions covered by an implicit government guaran-
tee.33 The most vocal critic of both the rule and its application is Mr. 
Dimon himself. He had famously described it as a misguided attempt to 
prohibit legitimate market-making activity that derived from the thinking 
of a man who “does not understand capital markets.”34 The failure of his 
bank’s risk management-systems has significantly reduced the authority 
of its chairman and chief executive to advocate for a weakening of exter-
nal oversight. Although regulators are aiming to finalize the Volcker 
Rule by the end of 2012, there is controversy as to whether it will be im-
                                                        
 29. Id. 
 30. Robert Lenzner, JPM Trade “Flawed, Complex, Poorly Reviewed, Executed, Monitored,” 
FORBES (May 12, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012-/05/12/flawedcomplex 
poorly-reviewed-executed-monitored/. 
 31. William D. Cohen, The One Thing Jamie Dimon Got Right This Week, BLOOMBERG (May 
12, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-11/the-one-thing-jamie-dimon-got-right-this-
week.html. 
 32. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 33. See, e.g., Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Relationships with Hedge Funds & Private Equity Funds, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL 
(Jan. 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study% 
20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf. 
 34. Peter Coy, JPMorgan’s Big Loss: Volcker’s Not So Dumb After All, BUSINESSWEEK (May 
11, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-11/jpmorgans-big-loss-volckers-not-so-
dumb-after-all. 
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plemented.35 It has transmogrified from a simple proposition to a gargan-
tuan policy framework informed by a wave of exceptions.36 
To date, JPMorgan has received no sanction from the New York 
Federal Reserve, which failed to monitor a trading strategy that had a 
material effect on international markets. Notwithstanding a campaign 
spearheaded by Elizabeth Warren, the former chair of the Congressional 
Oversight Panel, Mr. Dimon has not had to relinquish his position on the 
board of the New York Federal Reserve, where he sits on the pivotal 
strategy and compensation committees.37 While Mr. Dimon admits that 
the London Whale “was the dumbest thing [he had] ever seen,”38 he con-
siders the matter closed. At a recent Q&A session with summer interns 
he stated: “I want you to know the London Whale issue is dead. The 
Whale has been harpooned. Desiccated. Cremated. I am going to bury its 
ashes all over.”39 The hedging strategy may have been flawed, but so too 
were the compliance and risk-management systems.40 It has also demon-
strated accountability problems and a lack of credible capacity within the 
firm or beyond to police deviance. Indeed, for JPMorgan, once seen as a 
firm with bespoke capacity to manage risk, the regulatory problems are, 
if anything, mounting. 
Unrelated to the London Whale incident, the U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) sued JPMorgan on July 2, 2012, to re-
lease twenty-five emails in an investigation of possible manipulation of 
                                                        
 35. As we have seen from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s most recent pullback in 
relation to imposing restrictions on money market funds, the determination and capacity of industry 
remains exceptionally strong, especially in the context of an ideologically divided regulatory agency. 
See Statement of SEC Chair Mary L. Shapiro on Money Market Reform, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-166.htm 
 36. Id. 
 37. Elizabeth Warren After Jamie Dimon “Meet the Press” Interview Calls on JP Morgan 
CEO to Resign from NY Fed Board, ELIZABETH WARREN FOR SENATE (May 13, 2012), http://eliza 
bethwarren.com/news/press-releases/elizabeth-warren-after-jamie-dimon-meet-the-press-interview-
calls-on-jp-morgan-ceo-to-resign-from-ny-fed-board. Of course, Professor Warren has her own 
agenda linked to her successful contest for the Senatorial seat in Massachusetts in the 2012 election. 
 38. Andrew Trotman, Whale Has Been Harpooned: Dimon, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 13, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9472835/JP-Morgan-chief-Jamie 
-Dimon-defends-banks-says-London-Whale-has-been-harpooned.html. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Erik Schatzker, Dawn Kopecki & Bradley Keoun, House of Dimon Marred by 
CEO Complacency over Unit’s Risk, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-06-12/house-of-dimon-marred-by-ceo-complacency-over-un it-s-risk.html; Rachel Wol-
cott, Analysis: JP Morgan Repeats Basic Mistakes Managing Traders, REUTERS (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/15/us-jpmorgan-trading-management-idUSBRE84E0Y8201 
20515. 
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power markets in California and the Midwest.41 FERC argues that 
JPMorgan’s bidding techniques resulted in at least $73 million in im-
proper payments and that the bank improperly used attorney-client privi-
lege to withhold or redact fifty-three emails subpoenaed in April 2012.42 
The bank has also been served with subpoenas from the New York State 
Attorney General relating to the manipulation of the LIBOR.43 With 
JPMorgan now facing multiple investigations and significant ongoing 
litigation, its reputation as risk averse and well managed is now severely 
damaged. 
B. Barclays et al. 
The corruption of core values stated in banking reached an inflec-
tion point with a multifaceted international investigation relating to reve-
lations that Barclays officials and traders attempted to game LIBOR in 
June 2012.44 They did so by manipulating submissions near the height of 
the global financial crisis, thereby portraying that they were more cre-
ditworthy than they were, in order to facilitate derivative contract posi-
tions.45 LIBOR is tied to $10 trillion in loans and $350 trillion in interest-
rate derivatives.46 These revelations underscored the seriousness of the 
long-simmering scandal over how LIBOR is set and raised questions as 
to why regulators had not acted on behavior that was widely discussed in 
the media as far back as 2008.47 
                                                        
 41. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., No. 12-MC352 
(D.D.C. July 2, 2012). 
 42. Katarzyna Klimasinska & Dawn Kopecki, Dimon Faces Image ‘Nightmare’ with Energy 
Probe at JPM, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/jpmorgan-
probed-over-potential-power-market-manipulation-1-.html. 
 43. See, e.g., David McLaughlin, JP Morgan, UBS Said Among Banks Queried in Libor Probe, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-15/jpmorgan-barclays-
said-among-banks-to-get-libor-subpoenas.html; Ben Protess, State Regulators Widen Libor Investi-
gation, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 15, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/state-
regulators-widen-libor-investigation/. 
 44. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to 
Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees 
to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/ 
June/12-crm-815.html. 
 45. Id. 
 46. David Enrich, Carrick Mollenkamp & Jean Eaglesham, Libor Probe Includes BofA, Citi, 
UBS, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article-/SB1000142405274870381820 
457620599169854-8286.html. 
 47. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, 
WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121200703762027135.html. 
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The “honor system” method by which LIBOR is set renders it ex-
ceptionally vulnerable to manipulation.48 This brings to the fore the eth-
ics dimension of the CEDAR analytic framework. Each day the banks 
that contribute to the LIBOR-setting process send their interbank bor-
rowing rates directly to Thomson Reuters.49 The most important is the 
three-month dollar LIBOR.50 The rates submitted are what the banks es-
timate they would pay other banks to borrow dollars for three months.51 
Thomson Reuters discards the top and bottom quartiles and then uses the 
middle two quartiles to calculate an average.52 This methodology is fol-
lowed 150 times to create the LIBOR rates for all of the ten currencies 
and fifteen maturities in which the LIBOR rate is set.53 As the rates sub-
mitted by banks are estimates, not actual transactions, it is relatively easy 
to submit false figures.54 Evidence provided in the belated regulatory 
investigation and subsequent parliamentary enquiries shows that traders 
at several banks conspired to influence LIBOR by getting colleagues to 
submit rates that were either higher or lower than their actual estimate.55 
At Barclays, there were two types of motivations for rigging rates: 
individual and institutional. This distinction is important because Treas-
ury Select Committee testimony suggests that management was ignorant 
of the former but had indications of the latter activity.56 Individual trad-
ers were influencing the rates to profit on positions they had taken in par-
ticular trades and to benefit Barclays’ derivatives portfolio as a whole.57 
                                                        
 48. Mark Gongloff, Citigroup Manipulated Libor More Than Any Other U.S. Bank: Reports, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-gongloff/libor-scandal-
citigroup_b_1689853.html. 
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Emails and other records show that this occurred frequently from 
2005 to 2007 and occasionally until 2009.58 The then-CEO Robert Dia-
mond has called the traders’ actions “reprehensible” and maintained in a 
statement prepared for a British parliamentary committee that no one 
“above desk supervisor level” knew about it until the settlement was 
reached. 59 
At the institutional level, Barclays wanted to boost market confi-
dence in the bank’s stability during the global financial crisis.60 In 2007, 
Barclays became aware that they were submitting higher estimates for 
LIBOR than other panel banks.61 Relative to other banks, which were 
still submitting lower rates, Barclays looked at risk,62 a fact that the me-
dia emphasized.63 On August 31, 2007, Barclays had notified the British 
Bankers Association that borrowing pounds for three months would cost 
it 6.8% more than any other bank on the panel and a full eleven basis 
points above the official August 31 fix.64 On October 29, 2008, a tele-
phone conversation occurred “between a senior individual at Barclays 
and the Bank of England during which the external perceptions of Bar-
clays’ LIBOR submissions were discussed.”65 These individuals were 
later disclosed to be Robert Diamond and Paul Tucker, the current depu-
ty governor of the Bank of England who served as the executive director 
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of markets at the time of the conversation.66 In response, Barclays man-
agement issued a directive67 that Barclays should not be an “outlier” and 
that submitters should lower their estimates to bring Barclays “within the 
pack.”68 While this reaction strongly suggests that the idea of regulatory 
forbearance was at the heart of the misunderstanding between Barclays 
and the Bank of England, the Final Notice of the Financial Services Au-
thority (FSA) stated that “no instruction for Barclays to lower its LIBOR 
submissions was given during this telephone conversation” and that “a 
misunderstanding or miscommunication occurred.”69 A parliamentary 
investigation was more skeptical, noting in its report that “[i]t remains 
possible that the entire Tucker-Diamond dialogue may have been a 
smokescreen put up to distract our attention and that of outside commen-
tators from the most serious issues underlying this scandal.”70 
The LIBOR-rigging cartel was initially exposed on May 29, 2008. 
On that day, the Wall Street Journal reported that some banks might 
have understated borrowing costs in reports for LIBOR during the 2008 
credit crunch, and this may have misrepresented their financial stabil-
ity.71 But the British Bankers Association claimed that LIBOR continued 
to be reliable, noting that “the financial crisis has caused many indicators 
to act in unusual ways.”72 Similarly, the Bank for International Settle-
ments stated that “available data do not support the hypothesis that con-
tributor banks manipulated their quotes to profit from positions based on 
fixings.”73 And the International Monetary Fund found that “[a]lthough 
the integrity of the U.S. dollar LIBOR fixing process has been ques-
tioned by some market participants and the financial press, it appears that 
U.S. dollar LIBOR remains an accurate measure of a typical creditwor-
thy bank’s marginal cost of unsecured U.S. dollar term funding.”74 
But documents released by the New York Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of England from 2008 show that they were acutely aware that 
banks were disingenuous at best about their borrowing costs when setting 
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LIBOR and chose to take no action against them.75 In a telephone tran-
script, dated April 11, 2008, between a Barclays employee and an agent 
from the New York Federal Reserve, the Barclays employee stated, 
“[W]e know that we’re not posting . . . an honest LIBOR . . . and yet . . . 
we are doing it, because . . . if we didn’t do it . . . it draws . . . unwanted 
attention on ourselves.”76 In response, the New York Federal Reserve 
agent acknowledged, “You have to accept it. I understand. . . . Despite 
it’s against what you would like to do. . . . I understand completely.”77 
Similarly, the Bank of England and its deputy governor, Paul Tucker, 
were aware as early as November 2007 of industry concerns that the 
LIBOR rate was being set below market rates.78 Minutes to a meeting of 
the Bank of England Sterling Money Markets Liaison Group note that 
“[s]everal group members thought that Libor fixings had been lower than 
actual traded interbank rates through the period of stress.”79 
In March 2011, the media reported that U.S. regulators, including 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), were fo-
cusing on Bank of America, Citigroup, and UBS AG in their probe of 
LIBOR manipulation.80 And by February 2012, the DOJ had commenced 
a criminal investigation.81 On June 27, 2012, Barclays admitted and ac-
cepted responsibility for its misconduct set forth in a statement of facts 
incorporated into the agreement and paid a $454Ԝmillion regulatory fine 
to settle the case—$200 million to the CFTC, $160 million to the DOJ, 
and the remainder to the FSA.82 As a nonprosecution agreement, the set-
tlement did not pass through the federal court for approval of the terms, 
and DOJ has the power to enforce or proceed should it believe there is a 
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violation of the agreement.83 However, the “regulatory fine is just the 
beginning for Barclays, which is a defendant in some of the twenty-four 
interrelated Libor lawsuits aggregated” before a Manhattan federal 
court.84 U.S. liabilities may be higher because U.S. plaintiffs are permit-
ted to request punitive damages, while U.K. plaintiffs are limited to 
compensatory awards.85 “Criminal liability could be added to those regu-
latory fines and civil lawsuits.”86 Further, the Barclays settlement is just 
the first in the joint transatlantic investigation. On August 3, 2012, the 
Royal Bank of Scotland confirmed that it had retrenched staff in relation 
to the LIBOR scandal, with Chief Executive Stephen Hester stating that 
it “is a stark reminder of the damage that individual wrongdoing and in-
adequate systems and controls can have in terms of financial and reputa-
tional impact.”87 On August 15, 2012, Bloomberg reported that subpoe-
nas had been sent to JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group, HSBC, Citigroup, and UBS,88 all of which are being investigated 
with respect to LIBOR manipulation. On December 19, 2012, UBS ac-
cepted a nonprosecution agreement and fines of $1.5 billion to resolve its 
liability, while on February 6, 2013, RBS agreed to a deferred prosecu-
tion. In both cases, the banks accepted a criminal guilt plea from subsidi-
aries operating in Japan.  
While the method by which LIBOR is set largely contributed to this 
widespread collusion, it could not have persisted without negligent over-
sight and regulators’ failure to enforce. In the aftermath of the scandal, 
the New York Federal Reserve has played defense, stating that although 
in 2008 it was aware of the structural flaws in setting LIBOR, it lacked 
the jurisdictional power89 to effect any meaningful change other than 
providing written recommendations to the Bank of England.90 But the 
limits of jurisdictional authority have rarely been an issue for U.S. regu-
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lators when national interest issues have been privileged in the past, and 
it is far from clear that this state of affairs has changed.91 For its part, the 
Bank of England claimed that the recommendations lacked the granulari-
ty to either start an investigation or set off alarm bells.92 The tortured jus-
tifications provided at corporate and regulatory levels, while self-serving 
and deeply problematic, could also equally apply to regulators in the 
United States who are faced with equally serious questions of compe-
tence. 
In the United Kingdom alone, the LIBOR scandal has had a deep 
impact on regulatory authority. The Treasury Select Committee stated in 
its report that it was “concerned that the FSA was two years behind the 
U.S. regulatory authorities in initiating its formal LIBOR investigations 
and that this delay has contributed to the perceived weakness of London 
in regulating financial markets.”93 The strongly worded report noted that 
“the standards and culture of Barclays, and banking more widely, are in a 
poor state. Urgent reform, by both regulators and banks, is needed to 
prevent such misconduct flourishing.”94 The committee provided a dev-
astating critique of past, current, and future trajectories. It accused the 
FSA of privileging a myopic approach that blinded it to the initial and 
ongoing systemic failure of compliance at Barclays95: “[T]he FSA has 
concentrated too much on ensuring narrow rule-based compliance, often 
leading to the collection of data of little value and to box ticking, and too 
little on making judgments about what will cause serious problems for 
consumers and the financial system.”96 
In sharp contrast to the claims of sophistication and prudence that 
informed discussions of the risk-based approach of the British regulatory 
system prior to the Global Financial Crisis, the Treasury Select Commit-
tee now finds that “naivety” and inaction underscored “the dysfunctional 
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relationship between the Bank of England and the FSA which existed at 
that time to the detriment of the public interest.”97 It would appear from 
the trenchant views expressed by the Treasury Select Committee that not 
much has changed. The erroneous calculation by the bank, the FSA, and 
the Bank of England was that early cooperation would pay dividends. 
The settlement did not place the blame on any individual executive, nor 
was there initially any expectation from the regulatory authorities in the 
United Kingdom or the United States that resignations were required or 
appropriate.98 Each was taken aback by the ferocity of political criticism 
of the deal and the perceived lack of accountability for infractions that 
point to widespread collusion. The chairman of the FSA, Lord Adair 
Turner, belatedly acknowledged this lack of accountability and claimed 
that the activities of Barclays revealed “a degree of cynicism and greed 
which is really quite shocking . . . and that does suggest that there are 
some very wide cultural issues that need to be strongly addressed.”99 
The media firestorm that followed led to the forced resignation of 
both the chairman and chief executive officer of Barclays. It also led 
regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom to release a discussion pa-
per, the Wheatley Review, which outlined proposed changes to the gov-
ernance of LIBOR in an effort to recapture lost authority.100 Three con-
flating and conflicting dynamics informed the Wheatley Review.101 The 
paper was diplomatic about past regulatory failure, blaming the lack of 
external supervision on an incomplete mandate. It was forceful in detail-
ing the past and continuing risk of manipulation by market actors, and it 
was exceptionally defensive about the need to safeguard London’s cen-
trality in establishing global benchmarks. But in none of these areas did 
the paper offer either tangible evidence of how the proposed reforms 
would provide warranted confidence in the integrity of the LIBOR 
benchmark or thought leadership in the design of a potential succes-
sor. Acknowledging that “at least some serious misconduct”102 has oc-
curred, the review bluntly stated that “[r]etaining LIBOR unchanged in 
its current state is not a viable option.”103 It proposed two parallel strate-
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gies: strengthening the structural weaknesses, and identifying and evalu-
ating alternative benchmarks.104 Both are unconvincing and unlikely to 
induce any practical effect. 
The review limits intervention in the former while maintaining a 
veto on the implementation of the latter. Further, the review canvasses 
the merits of insulating the LIBOR submission process from trading 
desks by housing it within the risk-management function, enhancing ac-
countability by making named individual staff with requisite seniority 
responsible for managing compliance, and establishing overarching 
codes of conduct.105 At no stage does it address the structural weakness 
of risk management within the sector and the responsibility of the regula-
tor to ensure in the exercise of its supervisory powers that these are ad-
dressed. 
C. HSBC Holdings PLC 
The inability of HSBC to oversee how its affiliates were operating 
in critical markets became apparent on July 17, 2012, when the U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released a 340-page 
report106 that showed how these failures had left the bank vulnerable to 
significant financial and reputational penalties. The report, which accuses 
HSBC of failing to prevent billions of dollars worth of money transfers 
linked to drug cartels and terrorist groups, dates back to 2001.107 It sug-
gests that the bank created an operation that was “a systemically flawed 
sham paper-product designed solely to make it appear that the Bank has 
complied”108 with the Bank Secrecy Act109 and other anti-money launder-
ing (AML) laws, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.110 In particu-
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lar, the report finds that between 2007 and 2008 HSBC’s Mexican opera-
tions moved $7 billion into the bank’s U.S. operations.111 
Both Mexican and U.S. authorities issued warnings to HSBC that 
such an amount of money could only be reached if linked to narcotics 
trades.112 HSBC, it is claimed, also knowingly and willingly circumvent-
ed government safeguards designed to block terrorist funding, allowing, 
for example, affiliates to shield the fact that thousands of transactions 
involved links to Iran.113 An independent audit paid for by HSBC found 
the bank facilitated 25,000 questionable transactions with Iran between 
2001 and 2007.114 The report also detailed that HSBC “worked exten-
sively with Saudi Arabia’s Al Rajhi Bank, some owners of which have 
been linked to terrorism financing.”115 HSBC’s U.S. affiliate “supplied 
Al Rajhi with nearly $1 billion worth of U.S. banknotes up to 2010,” and 
“worked with two banks in Bangladesh . . . linked to terrorism financ-
ing.”116 
HSBC executives admitted as much at Senate hearings, where 
HSBC confessed to years of failure to comply with rules to prevent mon-
ey laundering.117 Mr. David Bagley, who had been HSBC head of group 
compliance since 2002, said that 
despite the best efforts and intentions of many dedicated profession-
als, HSBC has fallen short of our own expectations and the expecta-
tions of our regulators. . . . I recommended to the group that now is 
the appropriate time for me and for the bank, for someone new to 
serve as the head of group compliance.118 
As eloquently summarized by Mr. William J. Ihlenfeld II, U.S. Attorney 
for the Northern District of West Virginia, in a letter to officials at the 
DOJ, “HSBC is to Riggs, as a nuclear waste dump is to a municipal land 
fill.”119 
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Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) 
levied a $27.5 million fine against HSBC a week after the Senate report, 
the largest-ever handed out to a bank by the CNBV.120 The CNBV “cen-
sured HSBC for noncompliance with anti-money laundering systems and 
controls as well as its late reporting of 1,729 unusual transactions, failing 
to report [thirty-nine] unusual transactions, and [twenty-one] administra-
tive failures.”121 HSBC set aside $700 million to cover the potential 
fines, settlements, and other expenses related to the AML inquiry in the 
United States, a gross underestimation of the final payout;122 however, it 
has to date made no provision for potential fines or regulatory settle-
ments related to the global investigation into the manipulation of 
LIBOR.123 
The findings of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations were foreshadowed in April 2003, when the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and New York state bank regulators issued warnings 
with regard to “suspicious money flows”124 at the bank. A federal prose-
cutor was hired to oversee and install AML efforts at HSBC.125 Nearly a 
decade later, the Senate Report suggests that HSBC’s efforts failed.126 
The report lists how HSBC repeatedly put the pursuit of profit ahead of 
substantive compliance with AML provisions.127 Critically, the report 
faults HSBC’s regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), for “systemic failures”128 in the face of evidence of risky banking 
and accuses it of letting the problem “fester for years.”129 
The global failure of compliance and oversight suggests deep struc-
tural problems with HSBC’s core business model. Providing local busi-
nesses with a global imprimatur has been shown to be an exceptionally 
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dangerous strategy for both the bank and, through a failure of enforce-
ment, its regulator, the OCC, which is effectively accused of contributing 
to a national security failure.130 Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, argued that “HSBC 
used its U.S. bank as a gateway into the U.S. financial system for some 
HSBC affiliates around the world to provide U.S. dollar services to cli-
ents while playing fast and loose with U.S. banking rules,” and the OCC 
tolerated this situation.131  
Indeed, the OCC did not take a single enforcement action despite 
being aware of “multiple severe AML deficiencies, including a failure to 
monitor $60 trillion in wire transfer and account activity; a backlog of 
17,000 unreviewed account alerts regarding potentially suspicious activi-
ty; and a failure to conduct AML due diligence before opening accounts 
for HSBC affiliates.”132 Senator Levin’s investigation was to provide 
cover for an investigation that has perhaps even more serious implica-
tions for the governance of financial markets. 
D. Standard Chartered PLC 
On August 6, 2012, the New York State Department of Financial 
Services (DFS) accused Standard Chartered, one of the few banks to 
come through the global financial crisis with its reputation intact, of leav-
ing the U.S. financial system “vulnerable to terrorists, weapons dealers, 
drug kingpins and corrupt regimes,”133 primarily through its dealings 
with Iranian banks. According to the DFS, from 2001 through to 2010, 
Standard Chartered helped facilitate U.S. dollar transactions worth $250 
billion on behalf of Iranian clients, “which generated hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in fees”134 for the bank.135 Its investigation is based on 
what is claimed to be an examination of “more than 30,000 pages of 
documents, including internal SCB emails that describe willful and egre-
gious violations of law.”136 The phrasing raises a series of unanswered 
questions that call into question the manner in which the investigation 
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and its presentation has been handled. The order prompted a rigorous 
public response from Standard Chartered.137 In a statement, the London-
headquartered bank said it “strongly rejects the position or the portrayal 
of the facts as set out in the order issued by the DFS.”138 Standard Char-
tered pointed to the historical nature of the claims and the fact that, at the 
time, none of the account holders was designated “a terrorist entity or 
organization.”139 
This case presents a departure from regulatory strategy in earlier 
cases because the DFS in this case probed Standard Chartered on its 
own, drawing sharp criticism and accusations from other financial regu-
lators that it had acted outside the scope of its authority.140 The FSA 
claims that it was notified just ninety minutes before the DFS announced 
the allegations, breaching long-standing protocol among bank regula-
tors.141 Standard Chartered formed the same view. It asserted, “Resolu-
tion of such matters normally proceeds through a coordinated approach 
by such agencies. The Group was therefore surprised to receive the order 
from the DFS, given that discussions with the agencies were ongoing. 
We intend to discuss these matters with the DFS and to contest their po-
sition.”142 The effect was to reduce the legitimacy of the claim and to 
imply that the DFS was an outlier. Left unstated but strongly implied was 
whether political gamesmanship colored both the nature of the narrative 
and the overarching claim. 
This was a high-risk strategy given the capacity of the state gov-
ernment to revoke a license without reference to federal authorities. 
Eight days after the DFS threatened to revoke its New York state license, 
and one day before it was scheduled to appear at a hearing on the matter, 
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Standard Chartered agreed to settle the matter.143 While Standard Char-
tered initially responded that under $14 million of the $250 billion in 
transactions actually violated sanctions, 144 under the terms of the settle-
ment it agreed that the “conduct at issue” involved $250 billion.145 
Under the terms of the agreement, Standard Chartered agreed to pay 
a fine of $340 million, believed to be the largest ever for an individual 
regulator in an AML case.146 It also acquiesced to the demand to perma-
nently install appropriately credentialed staff to oversee and audit off-
shore money laundering due diligence and monitoring.147 More signifi-
cantly, the bank agreed to the appointment of an external monitor to be 
vetted by the DFS.148 The monitor will have responsibility for ensuring 
ongoing compliance with AML controls and will report directly to the 
DFS.149 In addition, the DFS has been given authority to place examiners 
on site within the bank.150 Following the announcement, New York Gov-
ernor Andrew Cuomo released a short statement that reignited questions 
of regulatory capacity.151 The settlement, he proclaimed, demonstrated 
the value of a tough and fair regulator for the banking and insurance in-
dustries.152 “This state and nation are still paying the price for a failed 
regulatory system and that must not happen again. This result demon-
strates the effectiveness and leadership of the new Department of Finan-
cial Services, and I commend the state legislature for creating a modern 
regulator for today’s financial marketplace.”153 
The settlement also received backing from Senator Carl Levin (D-
Mich.), the influential chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions who handed down the damning report relating details of HSBC’s 
                                                        
 143. Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Statement from Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superin-
tendent of Financial Services, Regarding Standard Chartered Bank (Aug. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1208141.htm. 
 144. Press Release, Standard Chartered Bank PLC, supra note 137. 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 146. Liz Rappaport, Bank Settles Iran Money Case, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444318104577589380427559426.html. 
 147. Consent Order Under N.Y. Banking Law § 44, Standard Chartered Bank 1 (N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Aug. 6, 2012). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Statement from Governor Andrew M. Cuomo on Settlement Between New York State and 
Standard Chartered, GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.gover 
nor.ny.gov/press/08142012-settlement-nys-standard-chartered. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
2013] Failures and Scandals at the World’s Leading Banks 963 
failure to install effective anti-money laundering controls.154 Senator 
Levin argued that the Department of Financial Services 
showed that holding a bank accountable for past misconduct doesn’t 
need to take years of negotiation over the size of the penalty; it 
simply requires a regulator with backbone to act. New York’s regu-
latory action sends a strong message that the United States will not 
tolerate foreign banks giving rogue nations like Iran hidden access 
to the U.S. financial system.155 
The success of the DFS in pursuing a case without the assistance of the 
DOJ or the U.S. Treasury Department is likely to embolden other states’ 
attorneys general, while adding pressure on federal regulators who have 
been criticized for a perceived lack of failure to confront large banks.156 
III. THE COMMON LINK 
A. The Failure to Act 
The JPMorgan and HSBC examples demonstrate the significant 
challenges that global reach poses to effective oversight. HSBC’s prob-
lems were magnified precisely because it privileged an affiliate, essen-
tially franchise-based model. It is a business model that HSBC has now 
begun to overhaul.157 “While our old model served us well historically, it 
does not work in an interconnected world where transactions cross bor-
ders instantaneously and where weaknesses in one jurisdiction can be 
quickly exported to others,”158 observed HSBC’s Stuart Levey in testi-
mony to Congress. He pointed out that 
better global integration makes us better situated today to manage 
our risk on a global basis, better able to see where risk in one part of 
HSBC may impact another part, and better able for the first time to 
ensure that consistent compliance standards and practices are im-
plemented across all of our affiliates.159 
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It is a laudable vision but one that cannot be vouchsafed without ex-
ternal review and validation. All too often, banks have made empty 
promises at congressional hearings before going on to commit further 
violations, with monetary fines written off as the cost of doing busi-
ness.160 In part, HSBC’s apparent conversion can be traced to narrow 
self-interest. Senator Levin warned that regulators must consider the ul-
timate sanction of bank charter revocation in the United States if banks 
fail to internally police deviance.161 The HSBC response reflects an 
awareness of custodial and gatekeeping obligations, which offer a poten-
tial model to transform corporate practice if monitored effectively. 
It is precisely for this reason that the intervention of the DFS has 
the potential to reshape the contours of financial regulation. Despite the 
lack of commentary from either the White House or federal executive 
agencies, the Standard Chartered investigation—and the manner in 
which it was handled—is certain to reignite the festering feud over how 
to regulate finance. Except for the physical bloodshed, the power strug-
gle for control of banking regulation and the difficulty of changing its 
culture finds remarkable parallels in Macbeth, the classic Shakespearean 
tale of political infighting. Like Banquo’s ghost, the specter of Eliot 
Spitzer and his battles with federal counterparts over the purpose of regu-
lation looms large. 
The conflict between state and federal authority over how to regu-
late finance has deep and complex roots. It traces back to the tenure of 
Spitzer as State Attorney General (SAG), where he prosecuted cases tra-
ditionally deferred to federal authorities, including civil actions and crim-
inal prosecutions relating to white-collar crime, securities fraud, internet 
fraud, and environmental protection.162 Spitzer’s power derived from the 
Martin Act of 1921, which permits the New York Attorney General to 
subpoena witnesses and company documents pertaining to investigations 
of fraud or illegal activity by a corporation. Spitzer used this statute to 
allow his office to prosecute cases that have been described as within 
federal jurisdiction.163  
The Supreme Court last adjudicated the issue of how to resolve this 
conflict in 2009 in a case that owes its origins to Spitzer’s questionable 
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use of executive authority, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n.164 In Clear-
ing House, the Supreme Court struck down attempts by the OCC to pre-
clude any state enforcement action against national banks.165 Simultane-
ously, it upheld the federal agency’s sole “visitorial” or supervisory 
rights.166 But the ruling left unresolved three critical policy questions. 
First, would state-based authorities risk judicial questioning as to 
whether enforcement via subpoena power amounted to a “fishing expedi-
tion”? As Justice Scalia warned in Clearing House, discovery limitations 
are designed to limit “unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, 
disadvantage, or other prejudice.”167 Second, would the states limit re-
sources to the prosecution of past violations of the law? Or would they 
seek to mold the substance of current and future corporate governance 
and risk-management systems, a key innovation associated with Spitzer’s 
settlement strategies? Again, as Justice Scalia noted in the majority Su-
preme Court opinion, the state has authority as law enforcer, a formula-
tion that limits capacity to effect regime change, which had famously 
underpinned Spitzer’s strategy in forcing the resignation of the chief ex-
ecutive at Marsh & MacLennan as a price of settlement in 2003.168 Third, 
notwithstanding the position of New York as a global financial hub, 
would enforcement take into account the operations of international 
banks or the collateral consequences of attempting to hold them account-
able? The investigation and settlement with Standard Chartered provide 
partial answers to each. Standard Charter’s status as an international 
bank adds a further complication. From the perspective of the New York 
authorities, Standard Chartered did not fall within the precedent set by 
the Supreme Court in Clearing House. This provided an opportunity for 
New York to again question the policy settings of the OCC. More fun-
damentally, it also reopens a series of questions over authority, mandate, 
bureaucratic processes, and use of discretion in financial services regula-
tion at a time when the authority and legitimacy of the federal model has 
come under sustained criticism. 
The publication of systemic AML compliance failures at HSBC in a 
Senate report and its damning assessment of the OCC provided perfect 
cover for the fledgling New York regulatory agency, led by Governor 
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Cuomo’s former chief of staff, Benjamin Lawsky.169 A lawyer with sub-
stantial experience prosecuting white-collar crime at state and federal 
level, Lawsky was appointed to the role of Superintendent of Financial 
Services.170 He was tasked with guiding its creation and stewarding its 
agenda, which, ostensibly, concentrated on consumer protection and re-
duction of the regulatory burden.171 The fact that its first major regulatory 
outcome was a reopening of the debate on how to embed restraint in 
global finance was as unexpected as it was inevitable, given the failure of 
federal oversight. 
In the Manhattan staging of the Scottish play, the hybrid roots of 
the DFS as a consumer protection operation primarily based on licensing 
rather than enforcement make it a perfect cast for the role of Malcolm, 
whose existence was seen as unthreatening to Lord MacBeth and his al-
lies until the moment of execution. First mooted in the 2011 State of the 
State Annual Address, the stated objective of merging the banking and 
insurance departments was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation.172 A report issued to the Governor as late as December 30, 
2011, noted the importance of creating a modern unified structure gov-
erned by “regulators who are more accessible, flexible and responsive 
than their federal counterparts due to a greater understanding of their 
home markets.”173 There is a passing reference to the fact that “given its 
position as the world financial capital, it is essential that New York be 
among the leaders in creating modern, effective and balanced regula-
tion.”174 There was no indication, however, that the new regulatory agen-
cy would seek oversight beyond the narrow confines of consumer protec-
tion, notwithstanding the right to request information on the operation of 
a license embedded in the enabling legislative provisions. 
It is precisely for this reason that the action taken against Standard 
Chartered caught the policy, academia, media communities so off guard. 
This included the advisors to Standard Chartered itself, who had volun-
tarily provided the information contained in a damning critique of its 
governance. This information resulted in a summons for the bank to at-
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tend a meeting at which the Superintendent of Financial Services would 
determine whether or not to revoke its license to operate—the ultimate if 
rarely used form of industrial decapitation.175 As noted above, the report 
of the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations regarding the OCC’s cata-
strophic failure provided essential political cover for a strike that was 
executed with clinical precision. 
Failure is not, however, limited to the Washington D.C.–New York 
City beltway. A similar problem afflicts the nexus between practitioners 
and regulators within the City of London. The inability to curtail the ma-
nipulation of the LIBOR has exposed similar failings. Crucially, it has 
opened a second line of attack from New York. Following the Treasury 
Select Committee hearings in London, the State Attorney General issued 
subpoenas to the contributing banks with operations in New York to re-
lease nonpublic compliance information relating to the operation of 
LIBOR.176 
The leaking of the investigation served multiple interests. It can be 
used to infer internal jockeying for position within the state government, 
an agenda designed to raise concerns about New York’s re-emergent 
muscularity. Or it can be used to force the banks under investigation to 
settle with the federal authorities. Since the initial leak, it emerged that 
both Britain’s RBS and Italy’s UniCredit were now under investiga-
tion.177 What is clear, however, is that the subpoena process has itself 
become a complex negotiation game. By deferring to court adjudication, 
the SAG risks accusations of frivolous, if not capricious conduct. As not-
ed above, a critical justification for the Supreme Court Clearing House 
compromise centered on judicial capacity to mediate mere “fishing ex-
peditions” by dismissing claims advanced without evidence.178 “In so 
doing the Supreme Court placed the reputation of the SAG on the docket, 
curtailing what had been viewed as the extortionist impulses of Spitzer at 
the turn of the millennium.”179 The evidentiary base for just cause, how-
ever, has been strengthened by the investigation into the manipulation of 
LIBOR, which extends far beyond the territorial mandate of either state 
or federal government. The investigation saw Barclays admit to charges 
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of manipulation and pledge ongoing cooperation.180 Crucially, unlike 
Standard Chartered, neither the implicated banks nor the involved federal 
regulators—in this case, the Commodity and Futures Trading Commis-
sion and the Department of Justice—shared the information with the 
New York authorities. Evidence aired at a parliamentary inquiry con-
ducted in London by the Treasury Select Committee provides additional 
information to justify the launch of a formal investigation. 
It will be difficult for the banks involved to challenge the subpoena 
process, once again giving New York the power to set the terms of set-
tlement. The fate of Standard Chartered provides an indication that its 
interests, if not necessarily those of the public, may be served by submit-
ting to federal oversight immediately. It is far from clear, however, to 
what extent the muscularity is the first stage of an exercise to privilege 
substantive reform or a tired replaying of a derivative script. While the 
conflict has all of the ingredients of an epic Shakespearian play, it may 
also provide confirmatory evidence of the classic Marxian political epi-
gram that history repeats first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.181 
Compliance or cultural problems within a single bank, no matter 
how serious, can be contained either by adoption of a structural reform 
highlighted by HSBC’s Levey, by external oversight as advanced by 
Lawsky, or if necessary, by closure as advanced by Senator Levin.182 
When the identified problems extend to allegations of collusion between 
banks, such as the manipulation of LIBOR, the entire social construction 
of the market itself comes under scrutiny. As noted by the chairman of 
the CFTC in testimony to Congress, “if these key benchmarks are not 
based on honest submissions, we all lose.”183 Lord Turner of the FSA has 
noted that it is now appropriate to adopt “a somewhat more intervention-
ist course to wholesale conduct issues,” aligned with warranted commit-
ment by senior management to the fostering of better culture and val-
ues.184 This can only be vouchsafed through the integrity and the robust-
ness of the compliance function. This in turn necessitates disaggregating 
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compliance from risk management and subsuming it within an integrated 
surveillance model capable of deployment by regulator and regulated 
alike. It is this critical function that the CEDAR model is designed to 
perform. 
B. Preemptive Regulation and the Design of Global Regulation 
The interaction of core conflicts exposed in the banking scandals 
raises a fundamental but often neglected question of regulatory design. 
What is the purpose of regulation? The appropriate first-order question is 
not how to regulate, but why. If new rules, principles, or standards, each 
altering the appropriate mix of regulatory strategies, are to be introduced, 
what should the benchmark be? Who should set it, and on what basis? 
When core values conflict, which approach or approaches should be pre-
ferred and why? Should interpretation of compliance and censure rest 
with the corporation itself, the market, the regulator, or wider society 
through legislative reinterpretation of the core responsibilities owed by 
the corporation? Can this be done in a piecemeal manner? Ultimate reso-
lution of these issues requires the articulation of a common standard of 
what constitutes responsibility and concomitant clarification of requisite 
accountability structures. The CEDAR approach to measurement and 
evaluation provides this essential framework. 
At the core of the design is the development of a capability model. 
Five key performance criteria are measured and evaluated: compliance, 
ethics, deterrence, accountability, and risk. The model differentiates be-
tween four levels of performance: world leading (setting new boundaries 
of excellence), exceeding sector best-practice, achieving best-practice, 
and lagging global standards. The proposed design involves scoping and 
applying thirty Key Performance Indicator (KPI) measurements for each 
dimension, giving 150 indicators in total. Critically, the framework has 
application for both the regulator and the regulated entity. This integrated 
approach to the evaluation of whether or how the regulatory regime en-
hances market integrity has the capacity to reduce contestation between 
institutional actors and align performance across each dimension to the 
furtherance of an overarching outcome—the demonstrable and verifiable 
commitment to integrity. For example, the deterrence KPI suite for a 
market-conduct regulator could include the number of enforcement ac-
tions, time lag between detection and prosecution, severity of offense, 
media management strategies, degree to which narrative is accepted or 
challenged, litigation success rate, emphasis on settlement and terms, 
scale of penalty, interaction with private enforcement actions (including 
class actions), degree of demonstration effect including evidence of im-
pact, impact on other strategic imperatives of compliance, ethics, ac-
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countability, and risk. It would also need to assess the extent to which 
enforcement action is itself aligned to overarching regulatory purpose. 
Overarching assessment depends on performance across each component 
of the CEDAR design. 
Built into the design is the guidance from the Australian Govern-
ment Productivity Commission and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) that regulator practice and perfor-
mance must be evaluated against both the structural environment and the 
processes and practices within that environment.185 Until now, there has 
been no systematic evaluation of performance, a lacuna recognized by 
the Productivity Commission.186 As a consequence, the Productivity 
Commission “sees considerable value in further research being undertak-
en into regulator practices and performance.”187 At a generic level, it 
notes that performance and the overall efficacy of a given system can be 
enabled or constrained by factors outside the control of regulators.188 
These factors include “the number of regulators and scope of the regula-
tion for which each is responsible; extent of independence and policy-
making responsibilities; and resources, enforcement tools, and discretion 
with which they are provided.”189 The report notes that there is increasing 
agreement on principles for administering and enforcing regulation.190 It 
also acknowledges that some principles may be difficult to render opera-
tional while maintaining consistency, coherence, and ongoing political, 
public, or corporate support.191 Comprehensive mapping is, therefore, 
required to ascertain whether the obstacles have structural or managerial 
roots. 
The CEDAR approach to regulatory effectiveness therefore assess-
es capacity and obstacles—structural and managerial—to achieving the 
objectives of substantive commitment to compliance, warranted com-
mitment to higher ethical standards, effective deterrence, enhanced ac-
countability and reduced risk. It does so in the context of a review of the 
overarching framework—legislative requirements, regulators powers, 
oversight arrangements—and the processes and practices the regulators 
themselves adopt within it. In so doing, it transcends the limitations of 
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equating compliance with ethical standards, effective deterrence, mean-
ingful accountability, and enhanced risk management. The case studies 
highlighted above demonstrate that compliance served no real function 
beyond window dressing. Of equal importance, they have also demon-
strated that accountability can only really be vouchsafed if the regulators 
themselves are held accountable, and it is questionable whether this can 
meaningfully be done in a national context. Given ongoing problems as-
sociated with implementing the global financial architecture, such as dis-
putes over OTC derivative clearing and money market funds regulation, 
it is unsustainable for regulation to be decided, implemented, and moni-
tored at a national level. Whether the control problems reflect a lack of 
resourcing, an erosion of restraint, or a lack of integrity remains unre-
solved. What is clear, however, is that the failure of compliance itself 
constitutes a material risk to market integrity, a core but to date uninves-
tigated dimension of financial stability. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Globally, the practical and conceptual underpinnings of financial 
regulation are being questioned as never before. The legitimacy problem 
is serious, pressing, and structural. It is one we ignore at our peril. It is 
being played out in the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The core system-
ic risk facing Europe, we are told from the markets, is concern that poli-
ticians will resile from failing and unworkable austerity agendas. An ob-
verse risk comes from continued fealty to the framework governing fi-
nancial regulation. We have become—or allowed ourselves to become—
powerless. 
The structural flaws inherent in the existing framework can be recti-
fied through integrating the five core dimensions of the CEDAR frame-
work: compliance, ethics, deterrence, accountability, and risk. Accounta-
bility can only be guaranteed if disputes over interpretation can be re-
solved in a manner that is proportionate, targeted, and ultimately, condu-
cive to the building of warranted trust in the operation of the financial 
services sector. Regulatory effectiveness cannot be vouchsafed merely 
by reforming the institutional structure. As we have seen, these rules and 
principles can be transacted around. Articulating the parameters of what 
constitutes “smart regulation” does little to improve the conceptual un-
derpinnings precisely because it lacks a normative dimension. Equally, 
enrolling actors into governance arrangements without articulating pre-
cisely what is meant by business integrity and accountability within spe-
cific contexts is unlikely to resolve the ongoing ethical questions. 
The policy problem is how to render this framework operational in 
a systematic, dynamic, and responsive way. To be successful, it needs to 
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balance specific economic efficiency (benefits to business) and profes-
sional rights to self-governance with explicit requirements that society 
should not be held responsible or liable for the failures of the former. At 
corporate, professional, and regulatory levels, the framework needs to be 
mutually reinforcing. It needs to be capable of evaluating the calculative, 
social, and normative reasons for behaving in a more (or less) ethically 
responsible manner. It also requires reciprocal obligation from each insti-
tutional actor to maintain, and certainly not contribute through omission 
or commission to the erosion of, the integrity of the governance ar-
rangements. It must articulate common understandings of what consti-
tutes the ethical problem.  
Following the banking scandals of 2012, it is unsustainable for reg-
ulation to be decided, implemented, and monitored at a national level. As 
HSBC has acknowledged, global oversight has become an imperative to 
reduce the conflicts of interest that may create profitable industries but 
not socially beneficial ones. It is a lesson that the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York and its British counterpart would do well to remember. 
